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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-TOWNSHIP
ORDINANCE PROHIBITING DISTRIBUTION OF ADVERTISING MATERIALS BY
DEPOSITING THEM ON PREMISES WITHOUT HOMEOWNER'S CONSENT
VIOLATES THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
Ad World, Inc. v. Township of Doylestown (1982)
Ad World, Inc. (Ad World) publishes Piggy-Back, a sixteen page tabloid,
consisting primarily of advertisements with several pages devoted to commu-
nity and consumer information.' Ad World distributes Pggy-Back through
local carriers who deliver the tabloid in a plastic bag, and affix it to a
mailbox or doorknob, or leave it on a homeowners' property. 2 In February,
1981, the Township of Doylestown (Township), enacted an ordinance (Ordi-
nance) outlawing the distribution, other than by mail, of advertising mate-
rial to residences without the prior consent of the person occupying the
premises. 3 Ad World brought suit against the Township, seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief and damages, on the ground that the Ordinance vio-
l. Ad World, Inc. v. Township of Doylestown, 672 F.2d 1136, 1137 (3d Cir.
1982),cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2240 (1982). In addition to providing a medium through
which local merchants can advertise, Piggy-Back also serves as a vehicle for news and
announcements of local origin and interest. Id. at 1138. Ad World's distribution
policy makes advertising rates per household reached sufficiently attractive that local
business can afford to advertise. Id Revenue from advertisements in Piggy-Back per-
mits Ad World to deliver the tabloid free of charge. Id.
2. Id. at 1137-38. Ad World began distribution of Pggy-Back to approximately
3,000 homes in Doylestown Township, Bucks County in October of 1980. Brief for
Appellant at 12, Ad World, Inc. v. Township of Doylestown, 672 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2240 (1982). Prior to that time, Ad World had distrib-
uted other local editions of its newspaper to approximately 100,000 households
throughout lower Bucks County. Id.
3. 672 F.2d at 1138. In the preamble to the ordinance, the Township Board of
Supervisors stated that it considered the unconsented depositing of advertising
materials on private property to be unsightly, and to constitute an invasion of pri-
vacy. The preamble further noted that, if the materials were not picked up within a
reasonable time, an accumulation of paper would present a clear indication to poten-
tial burglars that a residence was unoccupied. Id Consequently, the Board of Super-
visors ordained:
• . . it shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to dis-
tribute advertising material at a residence within Doylestown Township
(other than at the home of the person, firm or corporation distributing the
same) by placing such material at the residence, on the property, or in the
residential mail box of the person owning or occupying the residence, unless
the person, firm or corporation distributing such advertising material does
so based upon the affirmative request or consent of the person occupying
the residence. The foregoing provision shall not apply to the distribution of
advertising material through the United States mail service.
Id (quoting Doylestown Township, Pa., Ordinance 117 (February 1981)). The Ordi-
nance further provided that a violation was to be considered a summary offense, for
which the violator was subject to a fine not exceeding $300.00. Id
(765)
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lated the first and fourteenth amendments. 4 In response, the Township con-
tended that the Ordinance was necessary to protect its residents from
potential burglars and vandals who might be alerted to a resident's absence
by an accumulation of advertising materials.5 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concluded that because the
Ordinance was directly related to the Township's interest in public safety,
the Ordinance did not abridge Ad World's right to free speech and press as
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. 6
On appeal, 7 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holdtng
that a tabloid containing news and editorials in addition to advertising is
noncommercial speech, and an Ordinance requiring an occupant's consent
prior to home delivery of the tabloid violates the first and fourteenth amend-
ments. Ad World, Inc. v. Township of Doylestown, 672 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1982).
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech.8 This constitu-
tional guarantee embraces conduct embodying the dissemination of ideas,
including the right to distribute literature from door to door.9 For example,
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1139. While the Ordinance provided that it was also enacted for the
purpose of eliminating the "unsightliness" and "invasion of privacy" caused by resi-
dential distribution and accumulation of advertising materials, these ends were not
advanced by the Township as justifications before the district court or the Third
Circuit. See id; Ad World, Inc. v. Township of Doylestown, 510 F. Supp. 851 (E.D.
Pa. 1981).
6. 510 F. Supp. at 855. The district court initially concluded that Pzigy-Back
constituted "commercial speech" and as such, was entitled to a lesser degree of first
amendment protection than "noncommercial speech." Id. at 854-55. The court next
determined that the Township's asserted interest was, in fact, substantial. Id In
concluding that this substantial interest was directly advanced by the ordinance, the
district court apparently relied heavily on the testimony of Doylestown Police Lieu-
tenant White. Id at 844. White testified that the number of burglaries in Doyles-
town had doubled from 32 to 64 in 1980; that approximately one-third of these
burglaries involved residences where the house was vacant and many of these in-
stances included the presence of advertising materials. 672 F.2d at 1144 (Meanor, J.,
dissenting). Finally, the district court found that a more limited regulation would
not be effective in achieving the desired end, and concluded that the regulation was
not more extensive than necessary. 510 F. Supp. at 856.
7. The case was heard by Judges Gibbons and Sloviter and Judge Meanor of
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.
Judge Gibbons wrote the majority opinion and Judge Meanor dissented.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press
.... Id
9. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1937). The Court in Lovell stated
that, "[t]he [l]iberty of circulating is as essential to . . . freedom [of the press] as [is
the] liberty of publishing; indeed without the circulation, the publication would be of
little value." Id (quotingExparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877)). See also Village
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (ordinance prohib-
iting charitable organizations that do not use at least 75% of their receipts for "chari-
table purposes" from engaging in door to door solicitation of contributions violates
the first and fourteenth amendments); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610
(1976) (ordinance requiring an identification permit for door to door canvassing vio-
[Vol. 28: p. 765
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in Schneiderv. State,' 0 the Supreme Court held that a city ordinance requiring
that door to door solicitors first obtain state licenses' I violated the solicitor's
first amendment rights. 12 The Court noted that the ordinance imposed cen-
sorship, the abuse of which, "engendered struggle in England which eventu-
ated in the doctrine of freedom of the press embodied in our Constitution."'
3
The right to distribute materials from door to door is not dependent
upon obtaining the express prior permission of each resident to whom the
speaker wishes to communicate. 14 In Martin v. Cty of Struthers, 15 the Court
reversed the conviction of a religious solicitor who had violated a city ordi-
nance prohibiting door to door solicitation without the prior consent of the
lates the first and fourteenth amendments); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505
(1946) ("we have recognized that the preservation of a free society is so far dependent
upon the right of each individual citizen to receive such literature as he . . . might
desire that a municipality could not, without jeopardizing that vital individual free-
dom, prohibit door to door distributions of literature"); Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (ordinance prohibiting door to door distribution of litera-
ture violates the first and fourteenth amendments because "freedom [of speech and
press] embodies the right to distribute literature"); Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. City
of Thousand Oaks, 5 Cal. 3d 817, 489 P.2d 809, 97 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1972), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1042 (1972) (anti-litter ordinance prohibiting the residential delivery of
printed matter without the homeowner's consent is unconstitutionally overbroad).
10. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Schneider was a consolidation of four actions. Id at
148. The actions were: Kim Young v. California, id. at 154 (municipal code prohib-
ited the distribution of handbills to or among pedestrians upon any street, sidewalk
or park); Snyder v. Milwaukee, id at 155; (ordinance prohibited the distribution of
printed matter in public places); Nichols v. Massachusetts id. at 156-57; (ordinance
prohibited the distribution of handbills or similar types of paper in the city streets);
Schneider v. State i. (ordinance prohibited canvassing without a permit).
11. See id. at 158. The Irvington, New Jersey ordinance required that a person
obtain a permit from the police prior to canvassing, soliciting, distributing circulars,
or calling door to door. Id at 157.
12. See id. at 164-65.
13. Id at 164. The Court further observed that, "perhaps the most effective
way of bringing [constitutionally protected materials] to the notice of individuals is
their distribution at the homes of the people." Id In a later case, Mr. Justice Black
noted that the "preservation of a free society is so far dependent upon the right of
each individual citizen to receive such literature as he himself might desire, that a
municipality could not, without jeopardizing that vital individual freedom, prohibit
door to door distribution of literature." Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946).
14. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1942). In Martin, the
Court noted that, "[f]or centuries it has been a common practice in this and other
countries for persons not specifically invited to go from home to home and knock on
doors or ring doorbells to communicate ideas to the occupants or to invite them to
political, religious or other kinds of public meetings." Id. at 147. But cf. Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (ordinance prohibiting door to door solicitation of
orders for goods without the homeowner's prior express consent does not violate the
first and fourteenth amendments). The Breard Court sought to distinguish the earlier
Martin decision by reasoning that, while in Martin, the aim of the solicitors was reli-
gious, and hence, noncommercial, in Breard, the solicitor's aim was commercial and,
as such, entitled to less constitutional protection. Id at 643. For a discussion of the
lesser protection given commercial speech, see notes 26-30 and accompanying text
infra.
15. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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homeowner. 16 The Court reasoned that the individual homeowner, rather
than the city government, should decide whether the solicitations would be
received. 17 In so holding, the Marlin Court stressed the crucial role that door
to door distribution plays for those poorly-financed speakers who cannot af-
ford more expensive media.
18
While freedom of speech remains a valued right, the constitutional pro-
tection accorded speech is not absolute, and some measure of governmental
regulation is permitted. 19 Although the government may attempt to regu-
16. Id. at 142, 149. The petitioner, a Jehovah's Witness, went from door to
door, distributing leaflets advertising a religious meeting. Id at 142. She was
charged and convicted of violating a city ordinance which made it unlawful to "ring
the door bell, sound the door knocker, or otherwise summon the inmate or inmates of
any residence to the door" while distributing certain forms of literature. Id The
Court stated that it knew of no other state which had enacted an ordinance that
made a person a criminal trespasser for entering the property of another with an
innocent intent, and without an explicit command to stay away. Id at 147-48.
17. See id. at 143-44, 48. In this regard, the Court observed, "[t]he ordinance
does not control anything but the distribution of literature, and in that respect it
substitutes the judgment of the community for the judgment of the individual house-
holder." Id at 143-44. See also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949) (ordi-
nance prohibiting use of sound trucks which emit a "loud or raucous noise" does not
violate first and fourteenth amendments). While the Kovacs Court upheld the valid-
ity of the ban on sound trucks, it reaffirmed the principle announced in Martin that,
where a choice is possible, an individual must have the right to decide whether he
will or will not listen to the speaker. See id. at 86. See also Van Nuys Publishing Co. v.
City of Thousand Oaks, 5 Cal. 3d 817, 489 P.2d 809, 97 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1042 (1972) (anti-litter ordinance prohibiting residential delivery of
printed matter without the homeowner's consent is invalid because it denies the po-
tential recipient the choice whether or not to read). Cf Rowan v. Post Office Dep't,
397 U.S. 728 (1970) (ordinance permitting individuals to lodge objections with the
Post Office against the delivery of unsolicited mail and to prohibit its delivery does
not violate the first amendment). Although the Rowan Court upheld the ordinance,
it stressed that, "the mailer's right to communicate is circumscribed only by an af-
firmative act of the addressee giving notice that he wishes no further mailings from
that mailer. But see Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (ordinance prohibiting
door to door solicitation of orders for goods without prior, express consent of the
homeowners does not violate the first and fourteenth amendments). The Breard
Court distinguished Martin on the grounds that, "no element of the commercial en-
tered the [Martin] free solicitation, and the [Martin] opinion was narrowly limited to
the precise fact of the free distribution of an invitation to religious services. Id. at
643. See also Town of Green River v. Bunger, 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933) (ordi-
nance prohibiting the practice of "going in and upon" private residences by solici-
tors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants and transient vendors without the prior
consent of the homeowners does not violate the first and fourteenth amendments);
Commonwealth v. Sterlace, 481 Pa. 6, 391 A.2d 1066 (1978) (ordinance making it
unlawful for any person to distribute advertising material at a residence without the
prior consent of the homeowner does not contravene the first and fourteenth amend-
ments). For a discussion of the relationships between the commercial nature of cer-
tain speech and the intensity of judicial review of measures regulating that speech,
see notes 26-30 and accompanying text infra.
18. 319 U.S. at 146.
19. See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616 (1976) ("The Court has
consistently recognized a municipality's power to protect its citizens from crime and
undue annoyance by regulating soliciting and canvassing."); Martin v. City of
4
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late the content of speech,20 content-based regulations are presumptively at
odds with the first amendment. 2 1 The government may also attempt to re-
strict the vehicle through which speech is communicated by regulating the
time, place, or manner of the communication. 22 Reasonable regulations of
time, place, and manner are generally constitutional unless they excessively
constrict the flow of information or ideas. 23 The constitutionality of such a
Struthers, 319 U.S. at 143 ("the peace, good order, and comfort of the community
may imperatively require regulation of time, place and manner of distribution.");
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304, 306-07 (1940) (state is free to reasonably
regulate the time and manner of solicitation in the interest of the public safety, peace,
comfort or convenience).
20. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (upholding petitioner's
conviction under a criminal syndicalism statute, for advocating the duty, necessity or
propriety of crime as a means for accomplishing reform, and for voluntarily assem-
bling with a group formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndical-
ism); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding petitioner's Smith Act
conspiracy indictments for advocating and teaching the duty and necessity of over-
throwing and destroying the government of the United States); Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315 (1951) (upholding petitioner's disorderly conduct conviction stemming
from his refusal to stop orating after policemen had requested him to do so pursuant
to their judgment that violence would break out in response to his message); Chaplin-
sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (upholding petitioner's conviction based
on common law "fighting words" statute because "such utterances are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality).
21. See, e.g., Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85
(1977) (ordinance banning "for sale" signs for purpose of curtailing flight of white
homeowners from increasingly integrated community held invalid as ordinance
sought to regulate content of speech); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (state statute prohibiting phar-
macist from advertising prices of prescription drugs held invalid as statute sought to
regulate content of communication); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92
(1972) (prohibition on picketing in front of school which excepted peaceful labor
picketing held invalid as ordinance was drawn with regard to content). In Mosely,
the Court observed that "above all else, the First Amendment means that govern-
ment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter or its content." Id at 95-96. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 583 (1979). Professor Tribe summarized that, "regulations shown to be content-
related will be declared unconstitutional unless the government shows that the
message being suppressed poses a 'clear and present danger,' constitutes a defamatory
falsehood or otherwise falls within a specific unprotected category." Id
22. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding regulation confining distribution of printed materials to a
booth at state fair); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding ordinance
barring demonstrations near a high school); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968) (upholding indictment for willfully and knowingly mutilating a draft registra-
tion certificate even though done in protest to the Selective Service System and the
war in Vietnam); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding petitioner's con-
viction for violating a ban on "any device known as a sound truck, loud speaker or
sound amplifier [which] emits therefrom loud and raucous noises and is attached to
.. . any vehicle [upon] streets or public places"); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569 (1941) (upholding ordinance requiring parade permits where official discretion
to issue was limited exclusively to considerations of time, place, and manner).
23. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 412 U.S. 569 (1941). In upholding an ordi-
nance requiring paraders to first obtain permits, the Court stressed that "the question
1982-83]
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regulation is determined by weighing the substantiality of the government
interest against the degree to which speech has been constrained.2 4 While
this approach affords little refuge from the uncertainty resulting from deci-
sions made on a case-by-case basis, a few rules have been developed to guide
courts in their balancing test.
25
Initially, it must be observed that the manner in which the rules are
applied, and therefore, the manner in which the balance is struck, will de-
pend on whether the speech involved is characterized as "commercial" or
"noncommercial." '26 Commercial speech has been defined as speech which
does "no more than propose a commercial transaction," 27 or "speech related
solely to the economic interest of the speaker and its audience." 28 Although
commercial speech is now protected by the first amendment, 29 the Court has
in a particular case is whether [a] control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantly
abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for communication of thought."
Id. at 574.
24. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961) ("general regulatory
statutes, not intended to control the content of speech, but incidentally limiting its
unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the First or Fourteenth
Amendment forbade . .. , when they have been found justified by subordinating
valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily
involved a weighing of the governmental interest involved."). See also L. TRIBE, sUpra
note 21, at 582-84. Professor Tribe observed the recurring debate over whether first
amendment rights are "absolute" or whether the first amendment requires a balanc-
ing of the competing interests of expression and government justification for regula-
tions. Id. at 582. While the debate continues with regard to content-based
regulations, he noted that it is clear that non-content based regulations require a
balancing approach. See id at 583. See also Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study on the
Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482
(1975) (examining the balancing involved in the determination of the existence of less
restrictive alternatives); Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment. Absolutes in
the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962) (observing that judicial balancing in the
First Amendment context is not inappropriate because of the judiciary's apolitical
status); Frantz, FirstAmendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1429 (1962) ("Judg-
ed by its origin in Schneider, [a balancing test] should apply only to regulations of
time, place and manner which, though neutral as to the content of speech, may un-
duly limit the means otherwise available for communicating ideas to the public.").
25. See L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 583.
26. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 561 (1980) (Constitution accords less protection to commercial speech than to
other constitutionally protected speech); Ohralik v. Ohio state Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 455-56 (1978) (attorney's in-person solicitation of two women injured in automo-
bile accident was commercial speech, and not to be accorded full constitutional
protection).
27. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973) (newspaper help-wanted advertisements constituted commercial
speech).
28. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 556
(1982) (advertisements by electrical utility constituted commercial speech).
29. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748 (1976). Originally, commercial speech was not entitled to any constitu-
tional protection. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942). In
Chrestensen, the petitioner had distributed leaflets which contained an advertisement
for a commercial exhibition of a Navy submarine on one side, and on the other side,
[Vol. 28: p. 765
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clearly stated that it is entitled to less protection than noncommercial
speech .
30
After making this initial classification, a court must proceed to assess the
a protest against certain action of the New York City Dock Department. Id at 53.
Petitioner had been convicted of violating a sanitary code provision that prohibited
distribution of advertising matter in the streets. Id In upholding the conviction, the
Court stressed that the constitution poses no restraint on government regulation of
purely commercial advertising in the public forum as it does for noncommercial mat-
ter. See id. at 54. The Court further concluded that the affixing of the protest to one
side of the leaflet was merely for the purpose of evading the ordinance. Id at 55.
The Court thereafter retrenched from its position in Chrestensen. See Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818-20 (1975). Bigelow narrowed the impact of Chrestensen by
stating, "the fact [the decision in Chrestensen] had the effect of banning a particular
handbill does not mean that Chrestensen is authority for the proposition that all stat-
utes regulating commercial advertising are immune from constitutional challenge."
Id at 819-20. Finally, in 1976, the Supreme Court brought commercial speech
within the protection of the first amendment. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virgihni State Board, the
Court was faced with a regulation which declared that it would be considered unpro-
fessional conduct for a pharmacist to advertise prices of prescription drugs. Id at
748-50. Although the Court found such advertising to be commercial speech, it nev-
ertheless held that it was protected by the first amendment. See id. at 762-73. The
Court justified its decision by stating:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the alloca-
tion of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous pri-
vate economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those
decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end,
the free flow of commercial information is indispensible.
Id at 765.
30. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557 (1980) (service commission ban on commercial advertising violates the first
amendment, even as applied against commercial speech). While the Court struck
down the prohibition of advertising by a utility company, the majority observed,
"This Court's decisions on commercial expression have rested on the premise that
such speech, although meriting some [constitutional] protection is [deserving of less
protection] than other forms of speech." Id at 563-64 n.5. See also Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). In limiting the protection to be given commer-
cial speech, the Ohra/ik Court noted that: "[w]e .. .have afforded commercial
speech a limited measure of protection commensurate with its subordinate position in
the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might
be permissible in the realm of non-commercial expression." Id at 456.
In Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), the Court struck down a state disci-
plinary rule against lawyers' advertising as applied to advertisements for a low-cost
legal clinic. In striking down this regulation of commercial speech, the Bates Court
nonetheless observed that there were "commonsense differences" between commer-
cial and noncommercial speech which justify a disparity in constitutional protection.
Id at 381. See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 779-80 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (invalidating a ban on
advertisements for prescription drugs). Justice Stewart, in Virgima State Board,
stressed the difference between noncommercial speech which is ideological in nature,
and commercial speech which merely relates to tangible goods and services and is
therefore more durable, and less susceptible to a chilling effect. See id. See general/y L.
TRIBE, supra note 21, at 655-56 (noting various rationales for distinguishing between
commercial and ideological expression). In referring to commercial speech Professor
Tribe stated, "it is one thing to make eligibility for first amendment protection turn
on a difficult line, and quite another to use the same line for the far less momentous
7
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validity of a non-content based regulation of time, place, and manner of
speech. It is settled that the government must articulate a "substantial" in-
terest for the promulgation of a regulation which impinges upon free
speech.31 While many exercises of police power may be sufficient to satisfy
this burden, 32 the Supreme Court has not been willing to say that all police
power justifications are "substantial." 33 For example, in Schneider v. State, the
Court rejected the contention that an interest in keeping the streets clean
was sufficiently substantial so as to justify a prohibition on distributing
handbills in the streets.34 As the Court subsequently noted in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent School District,35 an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension
of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right of freedom of
expression. "36
Once a substantial interest is articulated, the government must next
show that its regulation directly promotes this interest by narrowly-drawn
means which do not unnecessarily interfere with first amendment free-
doms.3 7 Historically, the Supreme Court has used a "less restrictive alterna-
purpose of recognizing shades of dirence in the application of settled principles." Id
at 656 (emphasis in original).
31. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640 (1981); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 368 (1968); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 418 (1963); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
32. For government interests held to be substantial, see Heffron v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (interest in orderly crowd
movement at state fair); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (interest in main-
taining order in classrooms); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (interest
in preserving draft carLs); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (interest in
preventing fraud and burglaries).
33. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (municipality's interest in
preventing littering held insufficient to justify infringement upon speech).
34. See id. For a discussion of Schneider, see notes 10-13 and accompanying text
supra.
35. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
36. Id. at 508. In Tnker, students were suspended from a Des Moines, Iowa high
school for violating a school regulation which prohibited the wearing of black arm-
bands. Id. at 504. The students had worn the bands to protest American involve-
ment in the Vietnam War. Id The school district sought to justify the regulation on
the ground that the presence of arm-bands would disrupt studies. Id at 508. The
Court struck down the regulation, stating, "There is no indication that the work of
any class was disrupted." Id
37. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). In Button, the Court was
faced with a provision of the Virginia Acts of Assembly which made it unprofessional
conduct for any person or organization to solicit business for an attorney. Id at 423-
24. The NAACP, a nonprofit corporation, utilized legal action in addition to educa-
tional and lobbying activities to achieve its goal of eliminating racial discrimination.
Id. at 419-20. Claiming that the provision, as applied to the corporation and its
agents, violated the first and fourteenth amendments, the NAACP sought injunctive
and declaratory relief from enforcement of the statute. Id at 417-18. In finding that
the provision unduly inhibited protected freedoms of expression and association, the
Court observed that the provision was not sufficiently narrow to pass constitutional
muster. See id. at 435-58. See also Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636-39 (1980) (ordinance which prohibited charitable organiza-
[Vol. 28: p. 765
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tives analysis" in determining whether a regulation is sufficiently narrow so
as to pass constitutional muster.38 Under this analysis, the Court imposes on
the government the burden of demonstrating that some other regulation, less
restrictive of communicative activity than that enacted, could not advance
the asserted interest.39 Thus, in Martin v. City of Struthers,40 the Court invali-
tions that did not use at least 75 percent of their receipts for "charitable purposes"
from engaging in door to door solicitation was unconstitutionally overbroad);
Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (time, place, and manner regulations
"must be narrowly tailored to further the State's legitimate interest. Access to the
'streets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places [for] the purpose of exercis-
ing [first amendment rights] cannot constitutionally be denied broadly.' "); Beneficial
Finance Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983
(1977) ("a remedy, even for deceptive advertising, can go no further than is necessary
for the elimination of the deception").
See also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). In Kovacs, the Court upheld the
validity of a city ordinance that prohibited the use of "sound trucks" or other mobile
instruments which emit a "loud or raucous noise." Id at 89. The Court stressed that
its finding that the ordinance was constitutional was dependent upon a determina-
tion that no narrower means of achieving the governmental end were available and
that the speaker's ability to communicate was not absolutely thwarted, but that there
were alternative media through which he could communicate. Id at 87-89; L.
TRIBE, supra note 21, at 582.
38. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 639
(1980); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1943); Schnei-
der v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
39. See L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 686. Professor tribe observed that
whenever it can be demonstrated that the result of the government's rule or
policy is to limit in some significant degree the ease or effectiveness with
which a speaker can reach a specific audience with a particular message, the
government should lose the case unless it can establish than an important
public objective unrelated to the message would be sacrificed by any less
restrictive alternative.
Id. See, e.g., Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980)
(regulation of charitable solicitations held constitutionally infirm because the vil-
lage's legitimate interest in preventing fraud could be served by measures less intru-
sive than those chosen); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. at 147-48 (ordinance
prohibiting door to door solicitation held constitutionally infirm because there were
means less intrusive of free speech which could have adequately promoted interest in
preventing fraud and burglary); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. at 147 (anti-hand bill-
ing ordinance held unconstitutionally infirm because there were means less intrusive
of free speech would could have adequately promoted interest in preventing litter-
ing).
Because proposed alternatives to a scrutinized regulation will not necessarily be
as efficient in promoting the government's interest, courts have had to balance the
degree to which efficiency would be sacrificed by a proposed alternative against the
substantiality of the government interest. See Ely, supra note 24, at 1484-85. Profes-
sor Ely wrote:
'[Ijess restrictive alternative' analysis is common in constitutional law gener-
ally and in first amendment cases in particular. But there is always a latent
ambiguity in the analysis, and [United States v. ] O'Brien brought it to the
surface. Weakly construed, it could require only that there be no less re-
strictive alternative capable of serving the state's interest as eftiientoy as it is
served by the regulation under attack ....
[However], earlier cases protecting more traditional forms of expres-
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dated an ordinance that prohibited residential distribution, 4 1 pointing to
several available alternatives which would have served the government's as-
serted interest of crime prevention, but have a less chilling effect on
communication.
42
sion, although they too purported to apply a sort of less restrictive alterna-
tive test, gave it a significantly stronger meaning.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78
YALE L.J. 464 (1969). The author noted:
In one sense, a less repressive or even non-repressive alternative is always
available, provided that the government is willing to sacrifice effectiveness,
but if "less drastic means" made the test, it would simply signal that the
right in question had absolute protection. By some process or another then,
the Justices must estimate how much more they would cost-not merely in
terms of resources they would require, but also in terms of their effects upon
other, non first amendment social values-and measure against accompa-
nying gains these losses to expression, association and belief.
Id at 468-69 (citations omitted). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 687. In noting
that the less restrictive alternative analysis to be applied in the non-content based
free speech area is qualitatively different from that in other contexts, Professor Tribe
stated:
'less restrictive alternative' analysis in this context is not simply a label for
the conclusion that government has acted in an impermissibly broad man-
ner, unacceptably sweeping protected conduct under its prohibitory rules
I The reference to less restrictive alternatives in the context of facial
overbreadth challenges, particularly where government has acted in terms
of expressive content . . . is essentially conclusory . . . . In contrast, the
discussion of less restrictive alternatives in [the noncontent based context] is
a genuine part of the analysis itself; the availability of such alternatives is
relevant to deciding whether government has in fact left too little opportu-
nity for communicative activity ....
Id. (citations omitted). This analysis is, in essence, a balancing test, which, because
the first amendment casts a presumption in the speaker's favor, often requires govern-
ment to tolerate certain sacrifices in efficiency in order to promote its interest. See,
e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (it is preferable to require a viewer
subjected to offensive insignia to avert his eyes than to allow the state to regulate the
badge wearer). See also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. at 162. In Schneider, the Court
noted that alternatives less restrictive than distribution of handbills were available,
even if the alternatives created the inconvenience to the community of cleaning litter.
Id. Mr. Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, after proposing certain less restric-
tive alternatives, stated:
If it is said that these means are less efficient and convenient than bestowal
of power on police authorities to decide what information may be dissemi-
nated from house to house, and who may impact the regulation, the answer
is that considerations of this sort do not empower a municipality to abridge
freedom of speech and press.
Id at 164. But cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1968) (statute
prohibiting destruction of selective service registration card is the least restrictive
means to promote the smooth and efficient running of the selective service system).
40. 319 U.S. at 141. For a discussion of Martin, see notes 15-18 and accompany-
ing text supra.
41. For the text of the municipal ordinance proscribing the distribution of circu-
lars, see note 3 supra.
42. 319 U.S. at 147-48. The Martin Court observed that the city could punish
those who called at a home in defiance of the previously expressed will of the occu-
pant, or could, by use of identification devices, control the abuse of the distribution
privilege by criminals posing as canvassers. Id.
10
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Recently, however, the Supreme Court, in Heffion v. International Society
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. ," seemingly modified the traditional analysis of
the validity of a time, place, and manner regulation.4 4 In Heffon, the Court
upheld, as a valid time, place, and manner regulation, a rule enacted by the
Minnesota Agricultural Society, which prohbited the sale or distribution of
materials at the Minnesota State Fair,4 5 except from previously authorized
locations.46 While Heffion retained the requirements of content-neutrality
and the advancement of a substantial governmental interest as necessary
components of a constitutional regulation of speech or speech-related con-
duct, 4 7 the Court only briefly considered the availability of less restrictive
alternatives, finding that those suggested "would [not] deal adequately with
the. . . larg[e] number of distributors and solicitors. ' '" 8 Drawing upon lan-
guage from an earlier opinion,49 the Court shifted the critical inquiry from
whether the government had less restrictive alternatives available, to
whether there were alternative forums of communication available to the
43. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
44. See Note, 61 NEB. L. REV. 167 (1982) (criticizing the Court's shift in empha-
sis from an analysis which considers the availability of less restrictive alternatives to
one which considers the availability of alternative forums for the speaker).
45. 452 U.S. at 648-55. The rule provided in pertinent part: "[s]ale or distribu-
tion of any merchandise, including printed or written material except under license
issued [by] the society and/or from a duly-licensed location shall be a misdemeanor."
Id. at 643.
46. Id. at 643-44. Plaintiffs in Heffon were members of the International Society
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON), an international religious society espous-
ing the views of the Krishna religion. Id at 644. Plaintiffs contended that the rule
prevented them from practicing their ritual of Sankirtan, which required them to
distribute literature and solicit donations in public. Id. at 645. ISKCON further
contended that the restriction of distribution to a fixed location at the state fair vio-
lated their freedom of expression. Id. at 644-45.
47. Id at 647-56. The Court noted that the rule was not content-based because
it applied even-handedly to all who wished to sell written materials or to solicit funds.
See id The Court concluded that the state had a substantial interest in maintaining
the orderly movement of th crowd at a state fair. See id.
48. See id. at 654.
49. See id at 654-55 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)). The Court in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy noted that the prohibition on advertising was not advanced as a time,
place, and manner regulation. 425 U.S. at 771. However, the Court then stated,
"We have often approved restrictions of that kind provided that they are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant
governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample alternative chan-
nels for communication .... " Id See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980) (rejecting contention that Commission order bar-
ring utility from using bill inserts to discuss political matters was a valid time, place,
and manner regulation because order was based on content of speech, but stating
that to be valid, a regulation must leave open alternative channels of communica-
tion); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 632-33 (1951) (ordinance prohibiting com-
mercial solicitors from calling upon owners of private residences without owner's
express consent was not violative of first amendment because of commercial nature of
the speech and because ordinance left open traditional methods of solicitation).
1982-83]
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speaker.50 Concluding that such forums did exist, the Court upheld the
rule.5 1
While the Heffon Court stressed that the case involved a limited public
forum-the state fairgrounds52 -the Court referred in general terms to the
level of scrutiny required of a time, place, and manner regulation. 5 3 Thus,
the Hefron decision may be read as signalling the Court's willingness to re-
move some of the heavy burden that has been traditionally placed on the
government under a less restrictive means analysis. 54 As a result of the Hef-
50. See 452 U.S. at 648-49 & 645.
51. See id. at 654-55. The Court observed that the rule did not prohibit ISK-
CON from practicing Sankirtan outside the fairgrounds, nor did the rule prohibit
ISKCON from orally propagating their beliefs within the fairgrounds. Id
52. See id. at 650-51 & 655.
The nature of the forum in which speech takes place will affect the degree of first
amendment protection that the court will afford a speaker. See Grayned v. Rockford,
408 U.S. 104 (1971). The Grayned Court stated: "The nature of a place, 'the pattern
of its normal activities, dictates the kinds of regulations of time, place and manner
that are reasonable.' " Id. at 116 (quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22
VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1042 (1969)). The Grayned Court noted, for example, that mak-
ing a speech in the reading room of a library would unduly interfere with the func-
tion of a library, while the same speech might be perfectly appropriate in a park. Id.
See also Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972) ("Justifications
for selective exclusions from a public forum must be carefully scrutinized"); Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (invalidating ordinance forbidding all public meet-
ings on streets and other places without a permit, because "such use of the streets and
public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens . . . [and] must not, in the guise of regulation, be
abridged or denied). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 689 (noting that public
streets, sidewalks, parks and other places have achieved special legal status). Profes-
sor Tribe summarized as follows:
[C]lassification as [a] public foru[m] serves as constitutional shorthand for
the proposition that, in addition to its usual obligation of content-neutral-
ity, government cannot regulate speech-related conduct in such places ex-
cept in narrow ways shown to be necessary to serve significant
governmental interest. Thus such places cannot be put off-limits to leaflet-
ting, parading, or other first amendment activities merely to spare public
expense or inconvenience; more focused regulations of "time, place, or man-
ner" are constitutionally compelled---even if the regulation challenged as
invalid leaves would-be speakers or paraders with ample alternatives for
communicating their views.
Id (footnotes omitted).
Justice Roberts, writing in Schneider, maintained that a focus upon alternative
forums of communication should be immaterial in first amendment jurisprudence,
stating, ". . . one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate
places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." See 308
U.S. at 163. Cf G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1206 n.1 (10th ed. 1980). Professor Gunther inquired whether the availability of
alternative forums should be central to time, place and manner cases and whether the
Roberts' Schneider approach should be strictly limited to those cases which arise in
"traditional public forums." Id
53. See 452 U.S. at 654.
54. Justice Rehnquist has insisted that reliance upon a less restrictive alternative
analysis in scrutinizing noncontent based regulations imposes an excessive burden on
the government when it seeks to advance legitimate interests which constrain speech-
12
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fron decision, however, it is unclear what role, if any, a less restrictive alterna-
tives analysis plays in the scrutiny of a time, place and manner regulation
which is alleged to impinge on speech or speech-related conduct in the pub-
lic forum
5 5
Against this uncertain background, the Third Circuit commenced its
analysis in Ad World by addressing the publisher's contention that P'ggy-Back
was noncommercial speech. 56 The court noted that Piggy-Back contained
news and editorials as well as advertising materials, 57 and performed local
functions that were generally undertaken by larger metropolitan newspa-
pers.58 In determining whether the tabloid should be characterized as com-
mercial or noncommercial, 59 the court held that the appropriate test was not
whether the publication carries advertisements or is for profit,6 0 but rather,
"whether the publication as a whole relates solely to the economic interest of
the speaker and its audience." 6 1 Consequently, since P'ggy-Back was not
comprised purely of advertising materials,62 and there was no evidence that
related conduct. See Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 639
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Note, 61 NEB. L. REv. 167, 184-86 (1982).
55. Compare Tacynec v. City of Philadelphia, 687 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1982) (dis-
trict court erred in applying less restrictive alternative analysis in time, place, and
manner scrutiny) and Commonwealth v. Sterlace, 481 Pa. 6, 391 A.2d 1066 (1980)
(less restrictive alternatives are not to be considered in scrutiny of time, place and
manner regulations) with New York City Unemployment and Welfare Council v.
Brezenoff, 677 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1982) (district court erred infailing to apply less
restrictive alternatives analysis in scrutiny of time, place, and manner regulation).
56. 672 F.2d at 1139-40. Ad World also contended that even if Pigg,-Back were
found to be commercial speech, its distribution was protected by the first and four-
teenth amendments. Id at 1139. Although the Third Circuit agreed with Ad
World's contention that Piggy-Back constituted noncommercial speech, the court
treated Ad World's argument that commercial speech was still protected in a foot-
note. Id at 1139 n.6. The court observed that since the Ordinance was not focused
upon the truthfulness of the regulated advertising material or the harm to the public
caused by advertisements, even if Pkgg-Back were commercial speech, the Ordinance
would be subject to the same constitutional limitations as if it affected pure noncom-
mercial speech. Id.
57. Id. at 1139. The court noted that the ratio of news and editorials to adver-
tising was not significantly different from that of some established metropolitan news-
papers. d
58. d. The court observed that these functions include spreading information
generally and providing a medium for advertising. Id
59. For a discussion of the definition of commercial speech, and the distinction
in treatment that commercial and noncommercial speech receive, see notes 26-31 and
accompanying text supra.
60. 672 F.2d at 1139 (citing New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266
(1964)).
61. Id. at 1139-40 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)). For a discussion of Central Hudson, see note 30
supra. In addressing the commercial speech issue, the Third Circuit observed that
"[t]he line between commercial and noncommercial speech for first amendment pur-
poses cannot be drawn by some magic ratio of editorial to advertising content." 672
F.2d at 1139.
62. See 672 F.2d at 1140. The court further observed that even if Piggy-Back
consisted exclusively of advertisements, because the publication created a forum in
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the editorial comment was added "as a mere sham to convert a pure adver-
tising leaflet into noncommercial speech," 63 the court concluded that Pigy-
Back was noncommercial speech deserving of full first amendment
protection.
64
Finding Piggy-Back to be entitled to the full protection of the first
amendment, the court observed that Ad World had the first amendment
right to distribute its publication.65 While the court recognized that such a
right is not absolute,66 it stated that in order for the state to constitutionally
restrict the dissemination of speech, its regulations must be precisely tai-
lored 67 to further a substantial governmental interest.68 With this in mind,
the court proceeded to scrutinize the Township's asserted interest of prevent-
ing burglaries. 69 The court concluded that the Township had provided no
evidence of a strong correlation between the accumulation of advertising
materials outside a residence and the incidence of burglary. 70 Furthermore,
the court noted that the Township had undermined its burglary rationale by
not extending its regulation to materials other than advertising, the accumu-
lation of which also would arguably notify potential burglars of an owner's
absence.
71
which advertisers could compete for consumers' attention, it might be possible to
view Pggy-Back as qualitatively different from an advertising leaflet published by an
individual merchant. Id.
63. Id. at 1139 (citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942)).
64. Id. at 1140.
65. Id. (citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. at 143; Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444, 452 (1938); Expare Jackson, 96 U.S. 723, 727 (1877)).
66. Id (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940)).
67. See id. For a discussion of the requirement that a regulation impinging upon
speech be precisely tailored, see notes 37-42 and accompanying text supra.
68. 672 F.2d at 1140. For a discussion of the requirement that a regulation
impinging upon speech be in furtherance of a substantial governmental interest, see
note 31 and accompanying text supra.
69. 672 F.2d at 1140. The preamble to the ordinance indicated that the Town-
ship was also concerned with the unsightliness of residential distribution and with the
impact of such distribution on the privacy of residents, but the Township advanced
only the burglary prevention justification before the district court and Third Circuit.
Id. at 1138-39 & n.3. See also note 6 supra.
Addressing the state's interest in preventing burglaries, the court observed that
"in days of increased crime, a community may be legitimately interested in methods
of reducing, if not halting crime." 672 F.2d at 1140. But the court then went on to
state:
Though we are not ordinarily wont to interfere in the exercise of the police
power of a state government, or to question the wisdom and effectiveness of
its police methods, in matters impinging upon the first amendment we may
not permit undifferentiated fears to excuse the suppression of first amend-
ment rights.
Id.
70. 672 F.2d at 1140-41. The court observed that "[t]he number of burglaries in
Doylestown increased from 32 to 64 in the 1979-80 period. There is no evidence that
the increase occurred in the period following distribution of Pggy-Back, and no evi-
dence on the modus operandi of the burglars." Id at 1140 n.7.
71. Id at 1140. The court explained that, "[t]his leaves exempt the delivery of
[Vol. 28: p. 765
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Noting that door to door solicitation "with its attendant potential for
foul play" is protected by the first amendment,7 2 the Third Circuit found
that Ad World's door to door delivery must also be protected. 73 The court
then turned to an examination of possible less restrictive alternatives for ac-
complishing the government's purported purpose in enacting the ordinance.
Specifically, the court observed that homeowners' "no solicitation" signs
could be strictly enforced;7 4 forms could be attached to the papers that
would be returned by homeowners not wanting to receive Pi'ggy-Back;75 a
municipal office could channel complaints against distributors; 76 or home-
owners could be required to take steps to prevent accumulation while ab-
sent. 77 Consequently, since there were less restrictive alternatives available
to the Township, the court concluded that the ordinance did not pass consti-
tutional muster.
78
The Ad World majority accordingly found that it could not find the or-
dinance to be a valid time, place, and manner regulation 79 because it was
not narrowly drawn,80 and because the Township had failed to rebut the
publisher's contention that no reasonable alternative forums were available
to it.8 1 Thus, the majority declared the ordinance unconstitutional. 82
political pamphlets, of religious proselytizing materials, or of established newspapers
or magazines delivered on subscription. Yet these publications could lead to similar
accumulation and the same attendant risks." Id at 1140-41. Finally, the court noted
that if the homeowner's consent was obtained as required by the ordinance, there was
no evidence that there would be any less accumulation than would be present in the
absence of consent. Id at 1141.
72. Id. (citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. at 141). For a discussion of
the less restrictive alternatives analysis in Mart'n, see notes 40-42 and accompanying
text supra.




77. Id In analyzing the availability of less restrictive alternatives, the court ob-
served, "The Supreme Court has tenaciously protected the right of a speaker to reach
a potential listener and get the listener's attention . . . . It does not seem onerous to
impose on the potential listener some of the costs of this important freedom." Id.
(citations omitted). For a discussion of the balancing process a court undertakes
when confronted with a less restrictive alternative which imposes greater cost or sacri-
fices efficiency in advancing a governmental end, see note 39 supra.
78. See 672 F.2d at 1141. The court stated, "[t]he Township and the dissent are
completely silent on why some method of solving the paper accumulation problem
less intrusive on the rights of the press than [that chosen in the ordinance] would not
be equally effective. It merely reiterates that the regulation is minimal. That is not
enough." Id
79. Id. at 1141-42. However, in so concluding, the court agreed that the Ordi-
nance was not content-based. Id
80. Id at 1142. For a discussion of the requirement that a regulation be nar-
rowly drawn, see notes 37-42 and accompanying text supra.
81. See 672 F.2d at 1142. Ad World contended that community newspapers,
such as Piggy-Back, rely on universal house to house distribution by route carriers to
make their advertising rates attractive. See id. at 1138. While Ad World utilized the
United States mail system to deliver Piggy-Back while the injunction was pending, the
1982-83]
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Judge Meanor, in his dissenting opinion,a 3 disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the ordinance was not a valid time, place, and manner regu-
lation. a4 The dissent recognized the Township's interest in crime preven-
tion,8 5 and concluded that the record did in fact show a strong correlation
between the accumulation of advertising materials and the incidence of bur-
glary.8 6 Furthermore, the dissent maintained that the ordinance did leave
open adequate alternative channels for communication. 8 7  Specifically,
Judge Meanor noted that Ad World might rely on distribution by mail,88
leafletting in public places, 89 face to face distribution to homeowners, 9° or
distribution after the consent of the homeowners had been obtained.91 Be-
cause he determined that alternative avenues of distribution were available
to Ad World, Judge Meanor found the ordinance to be a valid time, place,
and manner regulation.
92
Reviewing the court's opinion, it is submitted that the Third Circuit
correctly defined Piggy-Back as noncommercial speech, entitled to the full
protection of the first amendment. 93 While the bulk of Pggy-Back was de-
voted to advertising,94 it is submitted that such a publication, taken as a
whole, does not appeal "solely to the economic interests of the speaker and
Township offered no evidence as to why this method of delivery was not prohibitively
expensive. Id at 1142.
82. Id
83. Id at 1142 (Meanor, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 1143 (Meanor, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1143-44 (Meanor, J., dissenting). Specifically, Judge Meanor relied
upon the testimony of Stephen White of the Doylestown Police Department, which
indicated that there was a correlation between the occurrence of burglaries and the
presence of signs that such residences were unoccupied. Officer White testified that
"[s]ome of the perpetrators [of the burglaries] said they looked at several signs that let
them know that there [was] no one there, and one of the signs is advertising in the
driveway of the home." The officer further testified that, upon investigation of bur-
glaries of unoccupied homes, he found evidence of signs that the residences were
unoccupied, including the presence of advertising materials. Id at 1144 (Meanor, J.,
dissenting).
87. Id at 1144-45 (Meanor, J., dissenting). Judge Meanor stated, "The conclu-
sion is inescapable that ample alternative avenues of distribution are available to
plaintiff." Id at 1145 (Meanor, J., dissenting).
88. Id Judge Meanor stated: "Anomolously, the majority notes that Ad World
has been using the U.S. mails to distribute its publication. Does not this fact, alone,






93. For a discussion of the Ad World court's finding that iggy-Back was noncom-
mercial speech, see notes 56-64 and accompanying text supra. For a definition of
commercial speech, see notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
94. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
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its audience," 9 5 and consequently should be defined as noncommercial
speech in the absence of a showing that the editorial or news comment was a
sham or pretext added to obtain full constitutional protection.
96
It is further submitted that the Third Circuit was correct in finding that
the Township had failed to demonstrate several criteria that are necessary to
find the ordinance valid under the first amendment. 97 The court deter-
mined that although the ordinance was content-neutral, 98 it could not be
viewed as a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation 99 because the
Township had not demonstrated that alternative forums were available to
Ad World.l °0 While Heffon imposed the requirement that there be alterna-
tive forums of communication available to a speaker in order for a time,
place, and manner regulation to be valid,10 1 it left unresolved the issue of
which party has the burden of demonstrating the availability or unavailabil-
ity of these forums.1 0 2 It is submitted that the Third Circuit's imposition of
this burden upon the government once the speaker asserts the unavailability
of alternative forums, both correctly reflects the preferred position tradition-
ally given to noncommercial speech and concommitantly remains consistent
with Hefon. 10 3
95. See text accompanying note 28 supra. Community newspapers, such as
Pigy-Back, perform an important function in the dissemination of highly localized
information which is of great value, but outside the scope of metropolitan newspa-
pers. Appellant's Brief at 10-11, Ad World, Inc. v. Township of Doylestown, 672
F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1982). For example, evidence before the district court indicated
that Pi gy-Back played a role in supporting attendance at local community events.
Record at 6, 14, 15.
96. For a discussion of one case in which the Court found noncommercial con-
tent to be a sham, see note 29 supra.
97. For a general discussion of the balancing process under the first amendment,
see notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
98. For a discussion of the Ad World court's finding that the Doylestown ordi-
nance was content neutral, see note 79 supra.
99. For a discussion of the place which time, place, and manner regulations
occupy in the scheme of freedom of speech litigation, see notes 22-23 and accompany-
ing text supra.
100. For a discussion of theAd World court's finding that the Township had not
satisfied its burden of demonstrating the availability of alternative forums, see note
81 and accompanying text supra.
101. For a discussion of Heffon's requirement that a time, place, and manner
regulation must leave open alternative forums, see notes 50-51 and accompanying
text supra.
102. See id. The language in Heffron dealing with the availability of alternative
forums gives little indication as to who shoulders the burden of proving their pres-
ence or absence. See 452 U.S. at 654-55.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938).
In Carolene Products, the Court upheld the power of Congress to regulate "filled milk"
and embraced the doctrine of judicial deference to acts of legislatures regulating eco-
nomic activities. Id. at 152-53. However, in footnote 4 of the opinion, Justice Stone
stated:
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments,
1982-831
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It is further submitted that the ordinance could not be upheld as a valid
time, place, and manner regulation because the Township had not demon-
strated why less restrictive alternatives would not have been sufficient to ad-
vance its interest in crime prevention.1 0 4 In applying this test, the Ad World
court was faced with the open question of whether an inquiry into less re-
strictive alternatives in scrutinizing a time, place, and manner regulation
had been foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Heffron . 105 While
the language of the decision relied on by the Court in Heffon 0 6 did not
incorporate a less restrictive alternatives analysis in assessing the validity of
which are deemd equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth .... It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more ex-
acting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment than are most other types of legislation ....
Id. n.4. See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). In Murdock, the
Court stated, "Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a pre-
ferred position." Id. Therefore it would seem inconsistent with the foundations of
judicial scrutiny of legislation restricting the right of speech to place the burden of
proof on the party asserting a fundamental right.
The differences in the nature of the forums in Ad World and Heffon should per-
mit a different imposition of burden on government. In a "pure" public forum case,
such as Ad World, if requiring the speaker to utilize another forum would require that
speaker to incur greater costs to reach his audience, or would reduce the size of his
audience, it is submitted that a court would be justified in concluding that no viable
alternative forum exists. However, as a forum becomes less of a pure public forum, a
corresponding increase in cost to speaker or reduction in size of the audience should
be tolerated.
104. For a discussion of the Ad World court's application of the less restrictive
alternatives analysis, see notes 72-78 and accompanying text supra. After the court
engaged in the less restrictive alternatives analysis, it noted that its conclusion that
the ordinance was insufficiently related to the asserted municipal interest to pass con-
stitutional muster would not be changed by viewing the ordinance as a reasonable
time, place, and manner regulation. See 672 F.2d at 1141. A question arises as to
whether the court's analysis should be interpreted to mean that the less restrictive
alternatives portion of the decision is inapplicable to its discussion of time, place and
manner regulations. It is submitted that the Ad World court did incorporate such an
analysis, scrutinizing the Ordinance as a time, place and manner regulation. First
the court observed that the Ordinance was not content-based. Id. at 1141-42. Sec-
ond, the court observed that the Ordinance could not be viewed as a reasonable time,
place and manner regulation because it was not narrowly drawn. Id. at 1142. The
court earlier had used a less restrictive alternatives analysis to determine whether this
requirement of narrowness and precision had been met. Id at 1140-41.
105. For a discussion of the Heiffon Court's use of a less restrictive alternatives
analysis in the scrutiny of a time, place, and manner regulation, see notes 47-48 and
accompanying text supra.
106. See generally Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). In Virginia Slate Board of Pharmacy, the regulation
at issue was found to be not content neutral and consequently, the Court determined
that it could not qualify as a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation. See id
The Court never reached the question of whether less restrictive alternatives play a
role in the scrutiny of a time, place, and manner regulation. See id at 770-83. For a
further discussion of V'rgitna State Board of Pharmacy, see note 29 supra.
[Vol. 28: p. 765
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the time, place and manner regulation at issue, 107 it is submitted that the
Heffon Court implicitly included such an analysis.' 08 Thus, it is suggested
that the Hefon Court did not intend to remove this analysis from the scru-
tiny of a time, place, and manner regulation. Furthermore, because of the
importance traditionally placed on a less restrictive alternatives analysis,' 0 9
it is submitted that the Third Circuit proceeded correctly in applying this
test to the Township ordinance."10
While it might appear that the Third Circuit's application of the less
restrictive alternatives analysis in Ad World was not totally consistent with
the Supreme Court's application of the analysis in Heffon,' I it is submitted
that the Third Circuit's willingness to permit a sacrifice in efficiency in the
advancement of governmental interests' 12 is justified in light of the fact that
the ordinance under scrutiny in Ad World sought to control the dissemination
of information in a context historically similar to a public forum,'' 3 whereas
the rule under scrutiny in Heffon sought to regulate expression in a limited
public forum." 4 Because of the historically important role which courts
have viewed house to house distribution as playing,'' 5 it is submitted that
the imposition of a greater burden on the government is justified. 116
107. See 452 U.S. at 647-48.
108. See id at 654-55. The I-e~fon Court determined that the rule directly ad-
vanced the state's interest and that it was no more extensive than necessary because,
"it was quite improbable that [the suggested less restrictive alternatives] ...would
deal adequately with the problems posed ....... Id. at 654. The main issue ad-
dressed by the dissenting judges was not that the majority failed to utilize a less
restrictive alternatives analysis, but rather that the majority had failed to apply the
analysis properly. See id. at 660-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see id. at 664 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). But see Tacynec v. City of Philadelphia, 687 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1982)
(less restrictive alternatives analysis is not part of the scrutiny of a noncontent based
regulation of time, place, and manner).
109. For a discussion of the role a less restrictive alternatives analysis played in
the traditional scrutiny of a time, place, and manner regulation prior to effon, see
notes 37-42 and accompanying text supra.
110. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's application of less restrictive alterna-
tives in Ad World, see notes 72-78 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
the use of a less restrictive alternatives analysis in the scrutiny of a time, place, and
manner regulation, see notse 38-42 and accompanying text supra.
111. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's application of the less restrictive
alternatives test in Hie~fon, see note 48 and accompanying text supra.
112. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's application of the less restrictive
alternatives test in Ad World, see notes 72-78 and accompanying text supra.
113. For a general discussion of the scope of judicial review in cases involving
infringement upon speech in the public forum, see note 52 supra.
114. For a discussion of the nature of the forum at issue in Heffion, see note 52
and accompanying text supra.
115. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's view of the important role that
house to house distribution plays in the dissemination of information, see notes 9-13
and accompanying text supra.
116. See, e.g., El, supra note 24, at 1484-90. Professor Ely indicated that in cases
involving regulation of traditional channels of communication, there should be a
heavy burden ofjustification placed on government, and that alternatives which sac-
rifice some efficiency or add some cost to government, should nonetheless be consid-
1982-83]
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The impact of Ad World's appears to be threefold. First, Ad World indi-
cates that community newspapers, and publications which contain noncom-
mercial information or editorial comment, not added as a pretext, are to be
classified as noncommercial speech, and consequently, are to be accorded
full first amendment protection.' 1 7 Second, it is submitted that Ad World
stands for the proposition that if the government wishes to regulate the time,
place, or manner of expression in the public forum, among other things, it
bears the burden of coming forward with a demonstration that alternative
forums are available to the speaker.' 18 Third, although Ad World's position
on the employment of a less restrictive alternatives analysis, in the context of
scrutiny of a time, place, and manner regulation, has been supplanted by a
subsequent decision in the Third Circuit,' 1 9 a reading of these cases, Heffion,
and earlier cases involving time, place, and manner regulations demonstrates
a need for the Supreme Court to clarify the Heff on approach.
The tension which exists in this area reflects the Supreme Court's desire
to allow the government to be able to advance substantial interests without
facing excessive burdens, and the need to insure that the government, in
attempting to advance those interests, does not unduly constrict speech.'
20
While inquiry into the availability of alternative forums is one valid measure
of the degree to which speech has been constrained, this factor has been
viewed with some skepticism by courts and scholars, 12 ' and in any event is
insufficient because there remains the need for a safeguard to insure that
only a minimal amount of speech is being constrained.'
22
J. Gordon Cooney, Jr.
ered viable alternatives. Id. at 1486-87. Professor Ely wrote, "an approach that
rejected only the gratuitous inhibition of expression could effectively close altogether
such traditional channels of communication as pamphleteering, picketing and public
speaking." Id. at 1487.
117. For a discussion of the court's treatment of the contention that Piggy-Back
constituted commercial speech, see notes 56-64 and accompanying text supra.
118. For a discussion of a manner in which courts might treat this issue gener-
ally, see note 103 supra.
119. For a notation of the subsequent Third Circuit decision and a general dis-
cussion regarding the debate as to whether an inquiry into the availability of less
restrictive alternatives remains a part of the scrutiny of a time, place and manner
regulation, see note 55 supra.
120. See L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 582-84 and 683-84.
121. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939). In Schneider, Mr.
Justice Roberts stated, "the streets are natural and proper places for the dissemina-
tion of information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of
expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place." Id. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 684. Professor Tribe
suggested that "a governmental action that excludes a communication from . . . a
public forum cannot be defended by pointing to the availability of alternative ways
to transmit the same message . . . ." Id.
122. For a discussion of the relationship of the least restrictive alternative analy-
sis to the requirement that a regulation be narrowly-drawn, see notes 37-42 and ac-
companying text supra.
It is suggested that the Supreme Court might attempt to clarify the situation by
[Vol. 28: p. 765
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employing the following two-pronged analysis. The first prong would be an inquiry
into whether the government has a substantial interest in utilizing a particular means
of regulation. The second prong would be an inquiry into the availability of alterna-
tive forums. Two primary factors would be of importance in determining the first
prong: first a determination of the substantiality of the end which is sought to be
achieved by the scrutinized means, and second, an inquiry into whether government
could have employed less restrictive alternatives to achieve that end. Depending
upon the substantiality of the end, the court could weigh the degree of sacrifice in
efficiency incurred by using a lesser means in promoting an end that it would tolerate
before declaring a proposed alternative to be not viable. For example, a court might
tolerate a substantial decrease in efficiency before a means is declared not viable if
the end sought to be advanced was that of litter-prevention. However, the court
might not tolerate this decrease in efficiency if the end sought to be advanced was
that of crime-prevention. If the court determined that the government had failed to
advance a substantial interest in utilizing a particular means, the infringement upon
speech should be held unconstitutional. However, if the court determined the gov-
ernment had advanced a substantial interest, the analysis should proceed to the sec-
ond prong.
The second prong would be an inquiry into the availability to the speaker of
alternative forums. Of primary relevance in this determination would be the nature
of the forum at issue in the particular case. If the forum were a traditional public
forum, or the speakers "cost" in getting to a similar audience would be substantial,
then the court should not find that alternative forums are available, and the govern-
ment should lose the case. However, if the forum is not a traditional forum and the
cost of reaching a similar audience was not substantial, the regulation should be held
to be valid.
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